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Clinical Essay
WORKING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE AND
PRESERVING CLIENT AUTONOMY:
IS THERE A ROLE FOR
"FACILITATIVE" LAWYERING?
RIcHARD D. MARSIEO*

Lawyers wishing to do social change work are placed in the difficult position of trying to provide the legal representation their clients
seek while at the same time not undermining their clients' autonomy.'
This is a difficult position to be in. First, the risks to client autonomy
inherent in any attorney-client relationship are exacerbated in social
change lawyering, as the client's social subordination may simply replicate itself in the attorney-client relationship. Second, the consequences of subordination are worse in social change lawyering than in
other contexts, as such subordination will defeat the social change
undertaking.
Two models of lawyering, "client-centered lawyering" and the
emerging "collaborative" model, offer much insight into the attorneyclient relationship and suggest ways to preserve client autonomy. 2 My
experience at the New York Law School Civil Law Clinic in representing two Clinic clients involved in social change work leaves me not
fully satisfied that either model is appropriate for all lawyers and clients involved in social change work. I suggest "facilitative" lawyering
as another model. Facilitative lawyering contains elements of both
collaborative and client-centered lawyering. However, it is somewhat
less self-consciously political than full collaborative lawyering and
seeks to preserve a more clearly defined role for attorneys as attorneys. Facilitative lawyering recognizes more of a risk to client auton* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank Tony Alfieri, Jean Marie
Brescia, Carol Buckler, Larry Grosberg, Mariana Hogan, Sarah Ludwig, Michael Perlin
and Robin Runstein for their thoughts on the issues raised in this Essay and their comments on earlier drafts.
I By "social change," I mean a shift in political, social, or economic power to groups
that have traditionally not enjoyed that power. Cf. Anthony V. Alfieri, PracticingCommunity, 107 HARv. L. Rnv. 1747, 1748 n.3 (1994) [hereafter Alfieri, Community]. In the
context of this Essay, where I discuss grassroots efforts to end bank redlining of low-income neighborhoods and to promote reinvestment, social change means redistributing
wealth by decentralizing control over decisions about the allocation of economic resources.
2 For a discussion of these models, see text accompanying notes 38-40, 75-94 infra.
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omy in social change lawyering than the client-centered model admits,
and carves out an appropriately more limited role for attorneys. In
addition, facilitative lawyering includes many of what might be considered more collaborative behaviors.
In Part I of this Essay, I describe how the Clinic began representing ARA, a community-based organization dedicated to fighting bank,
redlining in its community. With the advice and assistance of the
Clinic, ARA, which was a relatively new organization at the time, pursued administrative litigation as the primary means for challenging
redlining. In Part II, I describe a question one of ARA's board members raised about the race of students assigned to represent it and
about the Clinic's status as an outsider to the community.
In Part III, I reflect on these two pictures of the Clinic's relationship with ARA: on the one hand providing useful legal assistance, but
on the other engendering ARA's fears for its autonomy. I then examine how client autonomy is inherently threatened in any attorneyclient relationship, and how that threat is enhanced in social change
lawyering.
In Part IV of this Essay, I return once again to the Clinic's representation of ARA, examining why ARA's dependence on legal strategies emerged, even though I was aware of the risks to ARA's
autonomy and consciously tried to deal with the risks. In Part V, I
consider how collaborative models of social change lawyering might
view the Clinic's representation of ARA, but conclude that a collaborative role for the Clinic would not have been consistent with ARA's
autonomy. Finally, in Part VI, I consider facilitative lawyering as an
alternative model of social change lawyering, and examine the Clinic's
relationship with another client that I believe exemplifies this model.
I.

THE

CLINIC'S REPRESENTATION OF ARA IN ITS EFFORTS TO

FIGHT REDLINING

A few years ago, the clinical program at New York Law School
began to represent the Anti-Redlining Association ("ARA"), 3 a community-based organization, in its efforts to fight bank redlining in its
community.4 ARA was located in a neighborhood with a very low median income. Community residents were almost exclusively AfricanAmerican and Latino. ARA's office was in the heart of its community
in a converted tenement. ARA employed only a few paid staff mem3 I have changed the client's name to protect its identity.

4 Redlining is a broad term that describes several banking practices, including: 1) refusing to lend to a community; 2) lending a disproportionately small amount of money to a
community; or 3) lending at less favorable rates or terms to the residents of a community
because of irrelevant or illegal factors such as the racial composition of the neighborhood.
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bers. Its board members were volunteers. They all either lived or
worked in the neighborhood, and represented a limited cross section
of the area's population: young, middle-aged and elderly; men and
women; white, African-American, and Latino.
ARA certainly faced an uphill struggle in its attempt to end the
redlining of its community. Most banks had already abandoned the
neighborhood, leaving only a handful of branches for nearly three
hundred thousand community residents in an area covering several
square miles. Those bank branches that remained collected tens of
millions of dollars of deposits from community residents but returned
less than one percent to the neighborhood in the form of housing
loans.
Despite the difficulty of its task, ARA had several sources of leverage in trying to force banks to change their policies. The first was
community organizing. When ARA was founded, its primary antiredlining activities included community organizing and direct action.
Second, ARA had broad access to the print and electronic media,
which portrayed it as a David fighting Goliath, and wanted to link
ARA's efforts with a populist, anti-bank sentiment that was prevalent
at the time. Third, local politicians were favorably inclined towards
ARA's work and supported it when they could.
ARA gained additional leverage from two federal statutes. The
first was the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA"), which requires
banks to meet the credit needs of their entire communities, including
low- and moderate-income neighborhoods.5 The CRA permits any
member of the public to file with a bank's federal regulator an administrative challenge to a bank merger application on the grounds that
the bank is not meeting community credit needs. 6 With the Clinic's
assistance, ARA mounted challenges to several bank mergers, which
resulted in agreements with banks to make millions of dollars of loans
in its community.7 Second, ARA used the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act ("HMDA"), which requires banks to disclose statistics about
their home mortgage lending records.8 This data gives groups like
ARA the opportunity to collect, analyze, and publicize evidence that
5 28 U.S.C. §§ 2901-06.
6 Banks are required to obtain federal regulatory approval prior to merging, branching, or engaging in several other miscellaneous activities. Id. The CRA does not explicitly
grant a private cause of action and the courts have refused thus far to infer one. See, e.g.,
Harambee Uhuru School, Inc. v. Kemp, No. C2-90-949, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15125 at
*17 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 1992).
7 Although unfavorable legal interpretations of the CRA by the federal regulators
mean that challenges to bank mergers are rarely successful in preventing a merger, such
challenges generally have resulted in negotiated lending agreements, as banks fear the negative publicity and regulatory delay associated with these challenges.
8 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810.
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banks are redlining their communities. Again with the Clinic's assistance, ARA used HMDA to gather evidence for use in its challenges
and to issue reports publicizing the dismal state of lending in its
community.
The Clinic started working with ARA when ARA was new, having been in existence for a little more than a year. At that time, ARA
was still learning about community reinvestment and feeling out its
strategy and approach. Eventually, with the Clinic's advice, ARA
came to use filing or threatening CRA challenges as its primary way
of fighting redlining. The Clinic played a significant role in these challenges, including bringing to ARA's attention opportunities to challenge different banks and helping it determine which banks to
challenge. 9 ARA was still involved in other non-legal approaches to
fighting redlining, but such efforts were secondary to CRA challenges.
Eventually, through representing ARA in these challenges, the
Clinic became so deeply involved with ARA that we mutually decided
that the Clinic would provide representation to ARA on an ongoing
basis, whether or not a CRA challenge was pending. Thereafter, a
team of two Clinic students was assigned each semester to represent
ARA, under the supervision of one Clinic professor (usually me).
With this expanded role, the scope of the Clinic's work broadened as
well. CRA enforcement is an ongoing process that can be divided into
five steps, and the Clinic assisted ARA in each of these steps.' 0 Thus,
we helped ARA to: identify the credit needs of its community and
develop a credit needs statement as a basis for determining whether
banks were meeting those needs and to serve as a framework for negotiating with banks (Step One); identify banks to approach and
gather information about their CRA records (Step Two); analyze the
banks' CRA records (Step Three); approach banks prior to a CRA
challenge to discuss ways in which they could improve their records
(Step Four); and file CRA challenges to bank merger applications
(Step Five). ARA invited us to its board meetings, where we made
presentations about the work we were doing, kept ARA apprised of
relevant legal developments and the efforts of other anti-redlining
groups, and otherwise generally participated in the discussions.
9 Selecting a bank to target for a CRA challenge is a significant strategy decision, and
there are many options to pursue. These include challenging banks with branches in the
relevant neighborhood, challenging high-profile banks, or challenging banks with particular practices, such as excluding minority neighborhoods from their lending territory.
10 See Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20
FoRmHAM URa. LJ. 165 (1993). The federal regulators have proposed scrapping the cur-

rent CRA regulatory regime and replacing it, and much of the article may have to be
updated.
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CONCERNS ABOUT THE CLINIC'S REPRESENTATION

ARA's board met in the evenings at ARA's office in the community. At one meeting, held nearly a year after the Clinic began representing ARA, approximately twelve people were present, all sitting
around two long tables at the far end of ARA's office in the converted
tenement. Wo Clinic students, a white male and an Asian-American
male, and I (a white male) attended the meeting. The students made
presentations about the status of negotiations with a bank and an upcoming meeting with another bank to monitor its progress at fulfilling
a lending commitment. They also discussed their efforts to develop a
credit needs statement for ARA's community, which would be based
in part on a credit needs questionnaire circulated to community residents, small businesses, churches, and non-profits. After the presentations were over, but before the meeting ended, I left to attend another
meeting. The students stayed for the rest of the meeting.
As the meeting was about to end, an African-American board
member turned to the two Clinic students and asked why the Clinic
had not assigned African-American or Latino students to represent
ARA. He wondered how outsiders could produce a community credit
needs statement and said that people from the community often asked
him why ARA did not have an attorney from the community. The
students responded that they were not sure how students were assigned to cases and that they would speak to me about it."
The next day, we discussed the ARA board member's questions
with the entire Clinic class during the Clinic seminar. 12 We identified
several related concerns that might have led ARA's board member to
ask why we had not assigned more African-American or Latino students to represent ARA. First, we thought that the board member, by
raising the issue of the racial differences between Clinic students (and,
implicitly, me) and the residents of ARA's community, might have
been suggesting that cultural differences created by race and ethnicity
impeded the Clinic's ability to provide adequate representation.
11 The Clinic was (and still is) a multi-subject civil law clinic. We do our best to assign
students to work in the practice area of their choice. When this incident occurred, we had
two different CRA clients. Overall, only a few African-American and Latino students had
selected CRA as their practice area, and we had assigned one African-American student to
represent ARA prior to this incident.
12 It is not unusual that such issues are discussed in law school clinics. See Bill Ong
Hing, Raising PersonalIdentificationIssues of Class, Race, Ethnicity, Gender,Sexual Orientation, Physical Disability, and Age in Lawyering Courses, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1807, 1812

(1993) (clinic students discuss whether or not an attorney of color has a particular advantage working in a community of the same color or ethnicity, and whether a white attorney

could ever be effective and/or accepted in a community of color).
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Second, in raising both the issues of the Clinic's ability as an outsider to conduct a credit needs survey and the concerns of community
residents at outside representation, we thought that the board member might not have been concerned with race in itself, but with the
Clinic's status as an outsider. He might have been saying that outsider
representation threatened ARA's ability to accomplish its objectives
without depending on outsiders. In other words, he might have been
articulating self-determination and autonomy as another of ARA's
goals. Many community organizations involved in CRA work share
this goal. The CRA and HMDA emerged from a strong sense of the
importance of community empowerment and self-determination. 1 3
Some community organizers and commentators suggest that CRA is
more important as a community empowerment and organizing tool
than as a means for leveraging more bank loans. 14 A related motive
which did not occur to us, but which seems likely, was that the board
member might have distrusted our motives, thinking we were just a
few more people in a long line of outsiders looking to "help" his community; that we would do some work, gain some notoriety, and
15

leave.

Finally, we wondered whether the board member was articulating
a related "separatist" notion that a community that had been
subordinated-would be better off if it helped itself, without assistance

13 For example, when HMDA was passed, it was expected that HMDA data would
"allow people to have a voice in what happens to their neighborhoods." 121 Cong. Rec.
34,576 (1975) (statement of Rep. Stokes). "[C]ommunity groups, armed with the facts, can
protect the integrity of their neighborhoods and their own vital interests." S. RP. No. 187,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1975).
14 See, eg., Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance,and Community Economic Empowerment" StructuralEconomic Theory, ProceduralCivil Rights, and Substantive Racial Justice,
107 HARv. L. REv. 1465, 1469, 1520, 1543 (1994) (suggesting that CRA strategies should
be designed around community empowerment goals such as creating community-owned
financial institutions, because "[w]orking class, ethnic, and minority communities must
control their own destinies by wresting control of local finance away from non-local
institutions").
15 Cf. GERALD P. L6PEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PRO-

ORESSIvE LAW PRACTICE 287 (1992) (describing the worries of Dan, an attorney working
with a community-based organization, about what Etta, a leader of the organization,
thought about him: "I wondered what Etta must think of me. Am I just another in a long
line of white male, Jewish, lefty lawyers who's made an appearance in a low.income, ofcolor East Bay community, apparently looking to 'join the struggle?' "); Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1750 (describing why a community resident may have rejected the
author's offer to help: "He had good historical reason. I am a white, male lawyer-an
outsider.... He has seen people like me come and go. Not surprisingly, he may distrust
me; indeed, he seems to implicitly hold me responsible for the errors and ephemeral convictions of forgotten advocates.").
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from outsiders. 16 Again, CRA work could be consistent with this
17
philosophy.
During the seminar, the Clinic students recognized the importance of the board member's concerns and discussed them with the
Clinic faculty very seriously. Although the board member did not explicitly ask us to assign students to ARA based on race, we considered
whether we should do so. On the one hand, we felt that it was important from an academic perspective to recognize student practice area
choices and assign students to cases on that basis alone, regardless of
their race. One of the reasons for this was that we saw (and continue
to see) the Clinic as an opportunity to allow students to work on cases
in a subject matter of interest to them. On the other hand, we also
recognized that differences between attorneys and clients do have an
impact on the relationship, and could result in a less effective relationship. Nevertheless, we felt that we could try to overcome these differences. Ultimately, we decided that we should not assign students to
represent ARA on the basis of their race, and that we should continue
to respect student practice area selections. The class decided that I
would call the Board member the next day and discuss his concerns.' 8
The next day, I spoke to the ARA board member and told him
we had thought about and discussed his concerns. I asked if he
wanted to discuss his questions, and he said that it "was nothing, not
important." I explained to him that we assigned students to cases
based on their preferences. He was sympathetic to this policy, as earlier in his career he had been assigned to work in predominantly minority neighborhoods solely on the basis of his race, and he felt this
had been detrimental to his career. I said that we planned to continue
16 See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND

AMEPICAN LAW 24-25 (1990) (discussing separatism as related to school desegregation).
17 See Taibi, supra note 14, at 1482-83 (suggesting that CRA efforts should support a
localized, community-based mortgage lending process that embraces, rather than eschews,

cultural differences).
18 This is a good point to note that my entire handling of this incident raises several

questions about clinical teaching methodology. These questions bear on: the propriety of
the Clinic's case assignment system; the wisdom of my leaving ARA's board meeting;
whether clinic students can play a meaningful role in representation that is ongoing over
several years; the process by which we reached the decision about how to respond to the
client's request; and the decision that I would call the client to discuss his request as opposed to the myriad other ways we could have discussed the concerns with him. Another
related issue is how to resolve tensions between client wishes and clinic teaching goals, and
whether our resolution of the tension in this case was satisfactory. These questions are
beyond the scope of this Essay.
This is also a good time to mention that Carol Buckler, who teaches the Clinic with
me, noted that both in this Essay and in real life, Clinic students virtually vanish from the
story at this point. This is probably indicative of the difficulties of ongoing representation
in a clinic. Following our experience in this case, we have tried to deal with this problem.
See text accompanying notes 112-13 infra.
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to assign students to cases in this way, and that we would work to
address the concerns raised by his questions.
On reflection, I wonder why I did not pursue the board member's
concerns and whether he really meant it when he said that they were
"nothing." I have since surmised that I did not pursue it because I did
not want to have to confront such difficult questions, as I was afraid a
confrontation could result in the Clinic losing a client that fought redlining, a fight that I felt was fundamental to a more just economic
system. Similarly, the board member may have dropped the issue because he did not want to force it and risk severing ARA's relationship
with the Clinic.

III. THE

PARADox OF SOCIAL CHANGE LAWYERING

These two pictures of the Clinic's relationship with ARA-providing important legal services but engendering fears of dependency
on outsider attorneys-implicate a paradox that, for me, is one of the
central problems inherent when outsider lawyers represent groups
working for social change. On the one hand, client autonomy and
self-determination are necessary conditions for social change.' 9 In
fact, a person's movement from subordinated to autonomous is social
change. A lawyer may be very useful to a client's efforts to gain
greater autonomy. On the other hand, inherent in any attorney-client
relationship is a substantial risk that the client will become too
dependent on the lawyer. An attorney who represents a client who is
fighting subordination risks subordinating the client once again by
making the client dependent on the attorney. 20 In the context of social
change lawyering, such dependency would undermine client autonomy and subvert the process of social change.21 Resolving this paradox by defining a useful role for an attorney while also preserving
client autonomy is one of the most difficult tasks for social change
lawyers.2
In analyzing this paradox in the context of preserving ARA's autonomy, I suggest that autonomy has a two-part meaning. First, it
19 See, eg., LOPEz, supra note 15; Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law and Social Change,
13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984-85) [hereafter Bachmann, Social Change];

Lucie E. White, To Learn and Teach: Lessonsfrom Driefontein on Lawyering and Power,
1988 Wis. L. RFv. 699 [hereafter White, To Learn and Teach].
20 Cf. MrNow, supra note 16, at 47. As Minow suggests, it is difficult to acknowledge
victimization without repeating the victimization in the process of acknowledging it.
21 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 724 & n.108, 736, 740.
22 See Ruth Buchanan & Louise G. Trubek, Resistance and Possibilities: A Criticaland
PracticalLook at Public Interest Lawyering, 19 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 687, 713
(1992) ("One of the paradoxes of critical lawyering is that it criticizes the lawyer/client
hierarchy and the lawyer's claims to privileged knowledge, while maintaining that the lawyer has 'something to offer' disadvantaged groups.").
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means ARA's right to make its own choices, without undue influence
24
by others. This is a difficult task when the client is an individual;
the difficulties are multiplied when the client is a group such as
ARA.25 In this context, ARA's choice about how to fight redlining is
not the only client choice at issue. ARA's choice to seek the assistance of an attorney is also a choice that should be recognized as autonomous: a choice to marshal certain (outsider attorney) resources
to help solve a problem (redlining). 26 Once this choice is made, moreover, ARA's autonomy becomes relational. ARA's autonomy, and
that of its attorneys, must now be preserved within a relationship, and
the extent that the special and particular identities of both partieslawyer and client-are preserved is the touchstone for evaluating
whether the attorney-client relationship is autonomous. 27
Second, autonomy means ARA's ability to accomplish its goals
without depending on outsiders. 28 If the client loses control over carrying out its decisions on its own, and becomes dependent on outsiders, "social change" is perhaps only illusory and temporary. 29 It is
contingent on an outsider who may not always be willing or available,
and who may not have earned the trust of the community or understood its goals or values. 30 In the instance of ARA, to the extent that
23 See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 759-61 (1987)
[hereafter Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients].
24 See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUNsELORs: A CLIENT-CENrERED APPROACH (1991).
25 See Stephen Ellmann, Client-Centeredness Multiplied.:

Individual Autonomy and
Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L.
REv. 1103 (1992) [hereafter Ellmann, Client-Centeredness]. I am not as optimistic as
Ellmann that the obstacles to client-centered representation in a group context can be
overcome. In my experience in representing tenant associations, logistical problems and
the press of everyday life too frequently interfere with each individual member's ability to
participate sufficiently in the group to ensure that his or her autonomy is protected.
26 See id. at 1123. See also White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 736.
27 See MiNow, supra note 16, at 301; Ellmann, Client-Centeredness,supra note 25, at
1128 ("[tihe interactions between lawyer and client in some measure shape both parties").
My point about attorney autonomy potentially raises many issues. For example, is it a
breach of attorney autonomy to require her to zealously represent a client with whom she
disagrees? Such questions are beyond the scope of this Essay. For my purposes, autonomy
for the lawyer means the opportunity to be retained to offer, and to be able to provide,
services she is trained to provide.
28 Cf. id. at 1151 n.127 ("I just thought, if I looked tough and sounded tough and talked
tough and could give a... zesty kind of a speech, they'd go away thinking, 'Damn! I'm
glad that's our lawyer!' And in a way it was empowering to have a lawyer you felt was the
equal of the other side's lawyer, but it would be better if they came from meetings thinking, 'Damn! We did that well ourselves!' ") (quoting interview with Harriet Rabb by
author).
29 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 736.
30 Cf. L46PEz, supra note 15, at 312-13 ("Only a fool could miss the strong self-determination themes that run throughout the East Bay's Latino, Asian American, and African
American communities.... Of course, self-determination is never simple or absolute.
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legal strategies controlled by the Clinic became central to accomplishing ARA's goal of increasing lending in the community, ARA's autonomy would be undercut.31 ARA would be left with a sense of
powerlessness and dependence.3 2
There is an internal tension in this description of autonomy that
reflects the paradox of social change lawyering. 33 On the one hand,
autonomy requires that a lawyer respect the client's strategy decisions,
including the client's decision to choose a lawyer and to define (within
limits) the role the attorney will play. On the other hand, a lawyer is
to respect and promote clients' ability to function without dependence
on their lawyer.
Resolving this tension begins with recognizing that there is a
threat to client autonomy inherent in any attorney-client relationship,
whether it involves social change lawyering or not.34 Clients may surrender their power to attorneys due to attorneys' technical expertise,
their privileged access to the legal system, or their familiarity and de35
tachment in contrast to the clients' unfamiliarity and emotionalism.
Human communication is imperfect, and clients' ability to communicate their concerns, goals, and objectives to attorneys may be further
inhibited by their lack of trust in their attorneys, embarrassment at
revealing unsavory or unflattering facts, or inability to recognize legally relevant facts-and by the attorneys' failure to. listen. 36 Finally,
Even as the East Bay's Latino, Asian American, and African American communities try to
further develop and sustain their own respective businesses, agencies, organizations, connections, religious life, events, rituals, holidays, programs, bookstores, foods, arts, and media, they inevitably depend on the (mainly white) state and the (mainly white) market in
complicated ways.").
31 See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of
ClientNarrative,100 YALE LJ.2107,2146-47 (1991) [hereafter Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law]; White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 740-41.
32 See Steve Bachmann, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?,
19 N.Y.U. Rv. L.& SoQ CHANGE 391-92 (1991-92) (reviewing GERALD P. L6PEZ, RE.
BELLIOUS LAwyERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACrICE (1992))
[hereafter Bachmann, Hope]. One commentator has recently condemned traditional CRA
strategies as legitimizing an economic system that marginalizes and oppresses minorities.
See Taibi, supra note 14. In this view, the CRA represents nothing more than seeking
charity, and the resultant small increase in lending only reinforces an unjust economic system. Id. at 1467-69, 1513. This assessment reflects a broader view of legal strategies as
accommodationist rather than transformative. See Anthony V. Alfieri, The Antinomies of
Poverty Law and a Theory of Dialogic Empowerment, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc CHANGE
659, 688-98 (1987-88) [hereafter Alfieri, Antinomies]; White, To Learn and Teach, supra
note 19, at 741-42.
33 For a discussion of this paradox, see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
34 See L6PEz, supra note 15, at 220-21.
35 See Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, supra note 23, at 718.
36

See

BINMER ET AL.,

supra note 24, at 35-40 (inhibitors of communication between

attorneys and clients include ego threat, case threat, role expectations, etiquette barrier,
trauma, perceived irrelevancy, and greater need); Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, supra
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although a client seeks counsel because she believes there is a legal
solution to her problem, it may be that her non-legal concerns are
critical to her choice of legal alternatives, and attorneys may be particularly prone to overlook these non-legal considerations. 37
"Client-centered" lawyering techniques that attempt to eliminate
these risks to client autonomy inherent in the attorney-client relationship cannot be completely successful.38 The most well-intentioned attorney who employs a client-centered approach by actively listening to
the client, soliciting information about the client's legal and non-legal
concerns, and involving the client in identifying legal and non-legal
alternatives and selecting the best solution, cannot help but influence
the client's decisions in subtle ways.3 9 These include making relevancy
judgments about how much information to give the client, ordering
the information in a way that ultimately influences the client's choice,
and choosing the phrasing and styling of alternatives. 40
The risk to client autonomy inherent in the attorney-client relationship is exacerbated in social change lawyering. Difference in race,
gender, ethnicity, social or economic background, knowledge, power,
education, life experience, or sexual orientation-among other
things-may accentuate the threat to client autonomy. 41 These differences were complicated in the context of the ARA and the Clinic,
where the difference was both between us and many of ARA's board
members, and between us and the community ARA represented.
These differences, which are themselves a cause of social subordination, increase the chances that patterns of social subordination will
simply replicate themselves in the attorney-client relationship in social
change lawyering. 42 These differences may also enhance a generalized
lack of trust that may be present in all dealings between attorneys and
note 23, at 720-21,733; Ann Southworth, Taking the Lawyer Out of ProgressiveLawyering,
46 STAN. L. REv. 213,220 n.51 (1993) (reviewing GERALD P. L6PEZ: REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LEGAL PRACTICE (1992)).
37 See BINDER ET AL, supra note 24, at 5, 14-15.
38 See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness,supra note 25 at 1128 ("In fact, however, designing a method of interviewing and counseling individual clients that will infallibly ascertain
their true wishes is beyond our grasp, and probably always will be.").
39 See Southworth, supra note 36, at 216.
40 See Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, supra note 23, at 746-47; William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones's Case, 50 MD. L. Rv. 213,217 (1991); White,
To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 740-41.
41 See MINow, supra note 16, at 9-10; Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1749, 1752;
White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 762 n.223.
42 Stacy Brustin, Expanding Our Vision of Legal Services Representation-The
Hermanas Unidas Project, 1 J. GENDER & L. 39,43 (1993). See also LOPEz, supra note 15,

at 48; White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 740-41.
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clients. 43 Finally, the differences enhance the danger that the attorney
will fail to listen to or understand the client's concerns, both legal and
non-legal. 4
If social subordination is replicated in the attorney-client relationship, this may lead social change attorneys to practice in a way
that suppresses client autonomy.4 5 Lawyer pre-eminence and client
46
dependency may become the prevailing norms in the relationship.
As a result, the lawyer may discourage or ignore client efforts to share
the cliresponsibility or solve problems47 and may ignore or suppress
48
ent's perspective on, and description of, her problem.
The social change attorney's treatment of the client and suppression of the client's voice may further lead the attorney to a narrow
49
vision of solutions to legal problems, focusing primarily on litigation.
Legal approaches can, in turn, antagonize clients, especially if lawyers
use them to accentuate difference and promote hierarchy through
modes of speech and dress, legalese, artificial formalities, and limiting
50
the scope of the representation to "legal" tasks.
IV. ARA's

RELIANCE ON LEGAL STRATEGIES AND CLINIC
EFFORTS TO BE COLLABORATIVE

The paradox of social change lawyering worked itself out in the
Clinic's representation of ARA such that litigation in the form of filing CRA challenges to bank merger applications became ARA's primary mode of fighting redlining, and ARA relied heavily on the Clinic
to decide which banks to target and to litigate these CRA challenges.
I should note that a CRA challenge is different from affirmative litigation in the courts: it takes only one or two months; there are no plead43 See LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 37 (people "may not take lightly to questions or suggestions from outsiders"); Stephen Ellmann, Empathy and Approval. 43 HASNGs L.J. 991,
995-96 (1992) [hereafter Ellmann, Empathy].

44

See Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1752. See also Simon, supra note 40, at 221.

See Anthony V. Alfieri, Speaking Out of Turn: The Story of Josephine V., 4 GEO. J.
ETics 619, 625-26, 629 (1991) [hereafter Alfieri, Speaking Out]; Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator,Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of
Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1298, 1300-01 (1992).
46 See Alfieri, Speaking Out, supra note 45, at 625-26; Brustin, supra note 42, at 56;
Southworth, supra note 36, at 220 n.51; Lucie E. White, CollaborativeLawyering in the
Field? On Mapping the Pathsfrom Rhetoric to Practice, 1 CUIr. L. REv. 157 (1994) [hereafter White, CollaborativeLawyering].
45

LEGAL

47

See Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1755 n.19; Southworth, supra note 36, at

216, 220 n.51.
48

See Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 31, at 2118-32; Southworth,

supra note 36, at 216, 220 n.51.
49 See LoPz, supra note 15, at 61; Southworth, supra note 36, at 216.
50 See LOPEz, supra note 15, at 1, 47, 110, 293-94; Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at
1749; Southworth, supra note 36, at 220 n.51.
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ings, discovery, or hearings; and non-legal leverage such as bad
publicity or regulatory delay is very helpful to community groups
while the law is never helpful. As a result, challenges generally result
in banks' willingness to negotiate lending agreements, albeit agreements that never quite satisfy community groups. Nevertheless, CRA
challenges share many salient characteristics with judicial litigation,
particularly the existence of (very elusive and unhelpful) legal standards, baffling and inaccessible procedures, an unfamiliar and remote
forum (the decisionmaker is in Washington, D.C.) and a hostile, faceless, and nameless adjudicator (the federal bank regulatory
agencies).5 1
ARA's emphasis on CRA challenges, with the Clinic playing a
leading role, had several negative consequences for ARA. First, these
challenges forced ARA to tailor its view about what was happening in
its community to suit legal standards.52 For example, one board member was in the process of developing a critique of the traditional approach to CRA, asserting that the banks and regulators treated loans
pursuant to CRA as a handout and, in turn, treated the communities
that received them as dependent instead of self-determining. In his
view, ARA and groups like it acted more like brokers, bringing markets with viable and profitable lending opportunities to the attention
of banks, and banks should treat them like business partners.5 3 The
board member asked us whether we could incorporate this type of
argument in our CRA challenges and negotiations. We said that this
argument would not carry any weight in a CRA challenge. The problem with our response is not so much whether we were right or wrong
in our legal assessment, but that the board member felt constrained to
express himself in a legal context through the filter of the attorneys.
This emphasis on challenges also diverted ARA's energy from
organizing and mobilizing. 54 ARA's paid staff was so frequently attending meetings about, and dealing with, CRA challenges that it
hardly had the time to organize effectively. Similarly, CRA challenges
depoliticized the process of social change by creating the impression
that urban disinvestment was merely a violation of law and not the

51 For more about the CRA, see Marsico, supra note 10.
52 See Lucie E. White, Mobilization on the Margins of the Lawsuit: Making Space for
Clients to Speak, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 535, 545 (1987-88) (hereafter White,
Mobilization].
53 The board member's position had something of the flavor of Anthony Taibi's vision
of the CRA as a tool for developing community control of financial institutions. See note
14 supra.
54 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 742.
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result of entrenched economic and institutional forces.55 This emphasis on legal efforts, in turn, may have accentuated ARA's sense-expressed by ARA's board member when he questioned our
representation and then declined to press the issue-that ARA was
dependent on legal strategies to effectuate change. 56
What troubles me about the emergence of ARA's dependence on
legal strategies controlled by the Clinic is that I was familiar with the
critique of social change lawyering and we consciously tried to prevent
this from happening. In fact, the Clinic did much work that might be
considered more collaborative. 57 For example, we did not always exclude ARA's voice from CRA challenges to bank mergers; we made
efforts to include it by translating ARA's voice into words that the
formal legal system recognized. 58 In one challenge, for example, ARA
insisted on making an argument that one of the bank's business practices violated the CRA. The Clinic's legal research indicated that the
relevant federal banking regulator had previously ruled that the practice was not a CRA violation. Nevertheless, ARA insisted that this
argument be included in the brief. We hesitated, but after several discussions with ARA, constructed a novel and-to us-persuasive legal
argument. Although the regulators rejected this argument and denied
the challenge, the client's voice was heard, and the bank ultimately
changed its practice.
We did more to try to work collaboratively with ARA. We tried
to abandon professional-lawyer trappings, such as legalese and overdressing. 59 We almost always met with ARA at its office, not ours.6°
We did our best not to control our meetings with ARA. 61 We did
work that might be viewed as "non-legal," including going with an
ARA representative to each bank branch in its neighborhood to
gather pamphlets and other information, and analyzing bank lending
55 See Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 32, at 665; Taibi, supra note 14, at 1468-69, 151314.

56 See Bachmann, Social Change, supra note 19, at 6.
57 See LOPaz, supra note 15, at 53.
58 Including the client's voice in litigation is one suggestion for preserving client autonomy. See eg., Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 31, at 2140; Angelo N.
Ancheta, Community Lawyering, 81 CAL. L. REv. 1363, 1385 (1993) (reviewing GERALD
P. L6PEz, REBELLIOUS LAwYERiNG: ONE CHICANO'S Vmw oF PRoGRESsIvE LAW PRAc-

TicE (1992)); Cunningham, supra note 45, at 1299-1301; White, Mobilization, supra note
52, at 544, 552; Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 Buow. L. Rnv. 1 (1990) [hereafter White,
Subordination].
59 See Ldpz, supra note 15, at 293-94.
60 Id. at 280; Buchanan & Trubek, supra note 22, at 714-15.
61 See LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 311.
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statistics in order to produce a lending report.62 We joined forces with
other problem-solvers, including urban planners and organizers. 63 We
linked ARA with other anti-redlining groups on local, regional, and
national levels, and worked in coalitions. 64 We brought to ARA's attention the effect that national and international trends in the banking
industry and other developments such as NAFTA would have on community reinvestment. We included ARA members in fact investigation, 65 affidavit drafting, and brainstorming sessions. 66 We held a
seminar for ARA board members in legal negotiating techniques and
we consciously modeled and discussed negotiating behavior, emphasizing in particular the importance of preparation, follow-up, and precision. We spent a lot of time counseling ARA, and in particular
discussing non-litigation alternatives such as bank boycotts and establishing community-controlled loan funds. 67 In analyzing alternatives
and predicting outcomes, we downplayed the importance of legal doctrine, which was not difficult to do in the CRA context, where the law
was vague and unfavorable.68 We paid attention to ARA's non-legal
concerns. 69 We employed counseling techniques designed to do our
best to ensure that ARA's decisions were their own and were satisfactory to group members. 70 We made it clear that we supported and
agreed with ARA's objectives. 71 We consciously attempted to tell
ARA's story to the press, local politicians, and other natural allies,
including small businesses, housing developers, and small landlords. 72
During the course of the Clinic's representation of ARA, ARA
lost its funding. As a result, ARA lost its paid staff and its office
space, and was left only with its volunteer board members. As ARA's
financial crisis developed, I played a deeper and deeper role in ARA's
62 See White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 46, at 166 ("As the lawyer adopts
this learning posture, she begins to establish a basic level of trust with the group, and to
comprehend the unique tasks that the group needs her to perform. While some of these
tasks evoke familiar lawyer roles, others disrupt our preconceptions about what lawyers
do."). Cf. LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 287-89 (door-knocking); Brustin, supra note 42, at 42
(obtaining a work permit).
63 See Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1757, 1763.
64 Id. at 1757.
65 See LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 63-64.
66lId. at 212-13.

67 Developing a community-controlled loan fund is one way for groups such as ARA to
promote social change without dependence on outsiders. See note 14 supra.
68 See White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 740.
69 See BrMNER ET AL., supra note 24, at 17-19, 22-23; Southworth, supra note 36, at 214-

15.

See Ellmann, Client-Centeredness,supra note 25, at 1128, 1153-54.
See Ellmann, Empathy, supra note 43, at 996-97.
72 Cf. LOPEz, supra note 15, at 190-91 (describing an attorney's attempts to learn about
audiences other than a court that may be relevant to solving her client's problem, including
the police, city council and business community).
70
71
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activities, including performing administrative tasks and attempting to
mediate an ideological dispute among the board members.
In the end, however, ARA and the Clinic agreed that the Clinic
should no longer represent ARA. Both ARA and I realized that the
Clinic was too deeply involved in ARA's activities, and in order for
ARA to re-emerge as an effective community-based organization, it
had to do so on its own. ARA has yet to emerge as the anti-redlining
force it once was.
V.

A

COLLABORATIVE LAWYERING CITIQUE OF THE

CLINIC's REPRESENTATION

In representing ARA, the Clinic achieved good results, measured
in legal terms. We brought several CRA challenges which resulted in
agreements to lend several million dollars for affordable housing and
small business in ARA's community. Nevertheless, I am bothered by
many questions. Primarily, were these results gained at the expense of
ARA's autonomy? Could ARA have pursued other strategies that
would have been more effective in the long run in fighting redlining?
I also wonder why ARA's dependence on legal strategies developed even though we tried to avoid it. Did we not adequately bridge
the cultural differences between us and ARA's community? Were
those gaps too large to close? 73 I think that the concerns of ARA's
board member about the race of students assigned to represent it and
our status as outsiders hold the key to answering these questions.
I would like to examine the board member's concerns by focusing
more directly on the emerging "collaborative" model of lawyering as
described in various works by Tony Alferi,74 Lucie White, 75 and Gerald L6pez. 76 Although these works defy easy synthesis, they contain
several common threads that form the heart of the model of collaborative lawyering. These include blurring, to the point of eliminating,
the distinctions between lawyers and lay people and between legal
and non-legal tasks; politicization of the client's efforts; and deep and
intense involvement in the client's work. Collaborative lawyering
models recognize that lawyers are generally outsiders to client communities and that this status interferes with client autonomy, and suggest that the way to deal with this problem is to eliminate those
differences and become an insider.
My sense is that the collaborative lawyering analysis of the board
member's remarks would be that he was not so much concerned with
73 See Simon, supra note 40, at 221.
74 See Alfieri, works cited in notes 1, 31, 32 & 45 supra.
75 See White, works cited in notes 19, 46, 52 & 58 supra.
76 See L6ptz, supra note 15.
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race in itself, but with race as it was intertwined with the Clinic's status as an outsider, and as it affected our ability to become insiders.
While the Clinic may have made -piecemeal gestures to become an
"insider" and work collaboratively with ARA, the collaborative
model would suggest that we did not go far enough.
Ultimately, each commentator would have a somewhat different
view of how a full collaboration with ARA would have looked. For
Alfieri, it might have involved a highly political effort. We would have
explicitly established the fostering of "individual and collective client
acts of self-determination in order to broaden social and economic
forms of democracy" 77 as the goal of our representation. We would
have focused our work around organizing, mobilizing, and
education. 78
For White, our efforts might have included deep involvement in
efforts to help ARA reflect on the interconnection of redlining, reinvestment, and the organization of the economic system; to develop a
critique of the system; and to develop appropriate strategies and approaches. In effect, we would have helped ARA define its identity.
White refers to this as lawyering in the "third dimension," raising and
liberating ARA's consciousness. 79 We would have helped lead ARA
to an understanding of the limits of CRA challenges and prompted
ARA to develop alternatives or more creative litigation strategies.80
For L6pez, we would have taught self-help and lay lawyering, the
work he describes as "most characteristic" of rebellious lawyering. 81
According to L6pez, teaching self-help and lay lawyering is most effective at empowering clients because it shows clients they can help
themselves, even in contexts and fora that are traditionally considered
legal. "Empowered clients can begin to speak in their own voiceand to solve their own problems-without relying exclusively on the
advocacy of lawyers."2
According to L6pez, the starting point for true collaboration on
our part would have been to view lawyering as the art of changing
things through persuasion, and to recognize not only that ARA did
have this ability to persuade, but also that it was better at some forms
of persuasion than the Clinic.8 We needed to "carry through systemI7 See Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1762.
78 Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law, supra note 31, at 665, 694-95.
79 White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 46, at 157-58; White, To Learn and

Teach, supra note 19, at 761-62. See also Alfieri, Antinomies, supra note 32, at 697-701.
80 White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 742. See Buchanan & rubek, supra
note 22, at 691.
81 LOPEz, supra note 15, at 70.
82 Ancheta, supra note 58, at 1374, 1388.
83 LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 39, 50. See Ancheta, supra note 58, at 1372.
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aticaly... to regard subordinated people and their other allies as coeminent problem-solvers: ...[to] learn to make space, in more than
just [our] thoughts, for what they bring to the colaboration." 8' 4 Ultimately, we needed to learn "how to work with (not just on behalf of)
low-income people, [and] people of color."85
According to L6pez' analysis, effective collaboration would have
begun with grounding our work in ARA's community. L6pez argues
that "[r]adical lawyering somehow has to be anchored in the world
86
we're trying to help change. [It must be] built from the ground up."
L6pez' most effective social change lawyers "are deeply rooted in the
communities in which they live and work."7 In contrast, the Clinic
was not rooted in ARA's community.8 8 I was not, for example, like
Sophie (a fictional attorney who is quintessentially rebellious), who
"lives in the neighborhood where she work[s]," which "appears to
make all the difference in the world." 89 Thus, the Clinic did not "think
like an insider in both the lay and legal worlds. In this sense... [we
were not] bicultural and bilingual." 90
As a consequence of the fact that the Clinic was not rooted in
ARA's community, we did not get a "feel" for the problems in this
community. Much of the grassroots work that L6pez' rebellious lawyers do helps them get a "feel" for the client's situation in the client's
own terms-aiming to understand what the client thinks, feels, needs,
and desires. 91 To develop a feel, L6pez suggests that an attorney
...

84 LOPEz, supra note 15, at 213.
85 See Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1757 (citing LOPEz, supra note 15, at 37).
86 LOPEz, supra note 15, at 7, 38. Describing the efforts of one attorney who shows
"rebellious" tendencies, L6pez writes that "[ljike the very best modem anthropologists
and the most able streetwise activists, she senses the need to position and reposition herself
constantly in an effort to understand Zalaipa [the community in which her client owns a
business] .... [She] realizes, too, that to study well what she hopes to help change, she
needs to be connected to what's happening .
I..."
ld. at 212-13.
87 See Ancheta, supra note 58, at 1370 (describing L6pez' "rebellious lawyers").
88 In fact, one student assigned to represent ARA had to be assigned to another case
when she refused to go to ARA's neighborhood.
89 LOPEz, supra note 15, at 31. L6pez goes on to observe (through the eyes of Catherine, a would-be rebellious lawyer searching for a role model), that "[g]etting stuck in the
role of 'permanent outsider' is a real possibility here-this community has had more than
its share of so-called friends flitting in and out trying to make changes." Id. "Sophie works
most regularly with people in her own community-individuals, groups, lay advocates, and
professionals." Id. at 33.
90 Id. at 44. L6pez makes clear that "insider" status is not easily earned, through the
example he gives of another lawyer, Amos. Amos was born and grew up in the neighborhood, but had been gone for several years, prompting his observation that he was no
longer an insider, and needed "time and shared experience" to become an insider once
again. Id. at 34, 37. As a consequence, Amos' activities included completing a survey of
community needs, attending school board meetings, meeting with particularly effective
teachers, and reading back issues of the local newspaper. Id. at 36.
91 Id. at 61. See also Buchanan & ITubek, supra note 22, at 691.
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"draw on fairly universal experiences as subordinates."2 Getting a
feel is a necessary precondition to becoming an insider, so as to "acquire fluency in discourses of difference and to construct client identity in terms of problem-solving." 93
Had the Clinic become an insider and achieved a full collaborative relationship with ARA as described by Alfieri, L6pez, or White,
we might very well have satisfied the second aspect of autonomy that I
suggested earlier.9 4 That is, this form of lawyering might have enabled
ARA to accomplish its goals without dependence on outsiders. This
form of lawyering might also have helped satisfy part of the first aspect of autonomy, allowing ARA to make decisions without undue
influence from others.
Nevertheless, if the Clinic had been fully collaborative, I am not
sure that we would have fully satisfied this first aspect of client autonomy, for part of this aspect of autonomy is ARA's right to choose to
retain an attorney to perform certain tasks. ARA did not explicitly
ask the Clinic to be a collaborative lawyer and we never offered such
an approach. ARA appeared to want the Clinic to provide legal
assistance in the form of CRA challenges and to provide supplementary legal support, and that is what the Clinic did. A more collaborative approach would have been inconsistent with ARA's apparent
preference.
Here, perhaps, is where a traditional client-centered analysis
would stop. However, the fact that ARA did not explicitly ask the
Clinic to be more collaborative does not necessarily resolve the question of how the Clinic should have represented ARA. I suggested earlier that lawyers and clients do not always communicate effectively,
and that this may be exacerbated in social change lawyering.95 From
this perspective, ARA's board member's concerns about race and outsider status may have been a request for collaborative lawyering, a
request I did not hear. But if ARA wanted me to be a fully collaborative lawyer, I was not the right lawyer for the job. The collaborative
model requires an attorney with a high level of skill and even professional training at interpersonal relationships, with great sensitivity and
perception, 96 and with lots of time to devote to one client. I had
neither the time, training, disposition, nor inclination to be a collaborative lawyer. I suspect that many attorneys share these feelings and
supra note 15, at 61.
93 Alfieri, Community, supra note 1, at 1759 (referring to LOPEZ, supra note 15, at 38,
61).
94 See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra.
95 See text accompanying notes 34-50 supra.
96 White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 740-41.
92 LOPEZ,
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problems, and conclude that collaborative lawyering is not appropri97
ate for them either.
VI.

FACILITATIVE LAWYERING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE

I return now to the paradox of social change lawyering.
Although the collaborative model, if achieved, is designed to resolve
the paradox by effectively eliminating the gap between outsider attorneys and clients, collaborative lawyering may not be appropriate in at
least two circumstances: when the client does not want it and when
the attorney is not in a position to provide it. But this leaves a difficult
question. If collaborative lawyering does not work in all circumstances, is there another social change lawyering model that can protect client autonomy and maintain a role for attorneys? 98
I think there is an alternative role for lawyers to play, a role that
preserves client autonomy and offers a useful role for attorneys. This
role is as a facilitator-attorney, "more the oiler of the social change
machine than its motor." 99 A facilitator-attorney recognizes that the
client may simply want an attorney to perform tasks attorneys traditionally perform and to perform them without developing too much
control over, or becoming too deeply involved in, the client's affairs.
The goal of the facilitator-attorney is not to eliminate the distinctions
between herself and the client and work fully colaboratively with the
client, but to provide very specific legal assistance the client wants.
While the role of the facilitator-attorney is to contribute important
assistance, the assistance cannot be provided in a way that creates client dependency.
The facilitator-attorney recognizes that important differences
may separate lawyers from clients in a social change setting and may
impede the attorney's ability to understand and carry out the client's
wishes. The attorney recognizes that there is a high risk that the client
97

Cf. Bachmann, Hope, supra note 32, at 406 ("However, I would observe that some

people-like myself, though I am not necessarily proud of this-make better lawyers than
organizers.").
98 Cf id. ("The final question to address is what an activist attorney or law student
should do when faced with these findings.... [S]hould she ditch her law degree and go
organizing? In many cases the answer should be 'yes.' "); Simon, supra note 40, at 221
("Such observations might lead some to conclude that lawyers like me are so ill-equipped
to understand clients as socially distant as Mrs. Jones that it would be better if we didn't
try."); White, To Learn and Teach, supra note 19, at 74 ("What might a white lawyer possi-

bly do to help them? The question was not easy to answer.").
99 Bachmann, Social Change, supra note 19, at 21. See also Bachmann, Hope, supra
note 32, at 406 ("[L]awyers do have a role to play in advancing social change organizations ....
Their most meaningful contributions are to aid organizing efforts."); Brustin,
supra note 42, at 57 ("[t]he role of the lawyer in this grassroots process is to act more as a
facilitator than as an adviser").
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will become dependent. Such an attorney will attempt to overcome
these differences by using client-centered counseling techniques, paying careful attention to the client's non-legal concerns and attempting
to meet them. 1°0 In addition, the facilitative lawyer will employ many
of the collaborative techniques described earlier.10 ' Nevertheless, the
facilitative lawyer knows that these techniques will not close the gap
between herself and her client completely, nor remove altogether the
danger of client dependency. But rather than playing the role of
organizer or consciousness-raiser, the facilitative lawyer steps back,
does not become deeply involved in the client's full range of activities,
and instead seeks to provide the technical legal advice and assistance
the client seeks. The facilitative lawyer is more like a corporate counsel, performing important, supportive tasks, but leaving the client
intact.
From this perspective, the Clinic's experience in representing
ARA may be explained by suggesting that we did not find the correct
attorney-client fit in time. ARA did not ask the Clinic to be a collaborator; if that was what it needed, the Clinic was not in a position to
play that role. At the same time, the Clinic did not see then how a
more modest, facilitative role would have reshaped our actions; if we
had been aiming at such a role, perhaps we could have adjusted our
work accordingly. Earlier, I described the five-step CRA enforcement
process.102 The first three steps are essentially planning and analysis
(non-litigation) steps. The fourth and fifth steps are essentially litigation efforts, and involve executing the plan developed in the first three
steps. The Clinic was simultaneously involved in all five steps; such
involvement is more appropriate for a collaborator. Instead, in a
facilitative role, we could have helped ARA understand the first three
steps by, for example, providing it with CRA training. Or we could
have waited to represent ARA until it completed the first three steps,
and provided assistance with implementing the fourth and fifth
steps. 0 3
We need to know more, however, about the functions that
facilitative lawyers can play. In her article in the inaugural issue of the
Clinical Law Review, Lucie White calls for more practical investiga100 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
101 See text accompanying notes 57-72 supra.

102 See text accompanying note 10 supra.

We have recognized the lack of assistance for community groups seeking to learn
more about community reinvestment and, as a consequence, have founded the Community Reinvestment Clearinghouse. Housed at New York Law School, the Clearinghouse
103

does not offer legal representation to community groups. Rather, it provides information
to community groups about community reinvestment, is developing a resource library, and

offers training, materials, and other forms of technical assistance.
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tion into models of social change lawyering and describes her own
efforts to do such investigation. 104 The results of her work so far appear to recognize a role for facilitative lawyering in social change
work. In her field experiment in collaborative lawyering, she has
identified groups that can use a facilitator. Her students, for example,
have identified "[g]rassroots self-help initiatives .... [that] espouse a
self-help methodology .... These initiatives challenge professionals to
reconceptualize their own roles. They demand that outside professionals respect the expertise that their members have acquired, and
understand their own skills as supplementing, rather than replacing,
the know-how of group participants."105 Steve Bachmann, in writing
about his work representing ACORN, an organization seeking social
change through grassroots mobilization, has described a role for
facilitative lawyering as well, involving corporate and tax work, First
Amendment expertise, and criminal defense work to support
106
ACORN's organizing efforts.
Tasks that facilitator-lawyers can perform include work that is
supportive of, but not directly involved in, the work the client is seeking to accomplish. For example, for a client that is seeking to change
government policy through organized protest, a facilitator-attorney
can bail clients out of jail following acts of civil disobedience.10 7 A
client wishing to develop low-income housing can use a facilitative attorney to interpret regulations' 08 or to do the necessary legal work to
structure the project. 109 Non-legal facilitative tasks include mediating
client disputes or serving as a "fund-broker." 110
In the Clinic, we have had the opportunity to represent another
client fighting redlining-a community-based organization like
ARA-a client that has wanted us to play a facilitative role. The client, which I will refer to as "CBO," has developed a strategy to fight
redlining that primarily involves active engagement with banks
through low-intensity yet continuous pressure on them to improve
their lending records, community organizing and education, and linking reinvestment with broader economic issues. CBO also is willing to
consider legal approaches such as a CRA challenge, but only if these
methods will support and be consistent with its overall strategy. During the course of our representation, CBO has carefully and jealously
guarded its decisionmaking and its implementing of strategy, preserv104 See White, CollaborativeLawyering, supra note 46.
105 See id at 165-66.
106 See Bachmann, Hope, supra note 32, ai 406.

107 See Bachmann, Social Change, supra note 19, at 24.
108 See White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 46, at 166.
109 See Southworth, supra note 36, at 226-227.

110 See White, Collaborative Lawyering, supra note 46, at 166.
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ing for itself any work that it could do on its own. While CBO has
taken advantage of the legal services the Clinic has provided, CBO
has used our efforts to support and facilitate its broader non-legal approach. When CBO uses the Clinic to pursue a legal strategy such as
a CRA challenge, the legal approach is pursued in the context of an
overall non-legal effort, such as heightening the level of its active engagement with banks. This has generally meant threatening but not
filing a CRA challenge, and reaching a lending agreement for less
money than if we had filed a challenge.
When the Clinic began to represent CBO, CBO was very advanced in its thinking about anti-redlining strategy. I have already
discussed the five-step CRA enforcement process, comprised of determining community credit needs; gathering information about bank
lending records; evaluating the lending record of banks; attempting to
reach a lending agreement with a bank; and enforcing the CRA
through the legal process."' 1 CBO had completed the first three steps
of the process before it approached the Clinic for legal assistance.
One key to its ability to do this was that CBO had the help of an
experienced organizer. With his assistance, the group learned about
the CRA and HMDA on its own, analyzed the housing needs of its
community, prepared charts and maps analyzing the lending records
of local banks, held a community forum with the banks to announce
the results and to make a reinvestment proposal to the banks, developed its own lending programs, and targeted one bank (which I will
refer to as "ABC Bank"), with a particularly poor community lending
record, for further discussions.
The Clinic agreed to represent CBO in its efforts to convince
ABC Bank to change its policy. ABC Bank, although it had a branch
in CBO's neighborhood with tens of millions of dollars of deposits,
had a policy of not making home mortgage loans. Clinic students conducted fact investigation and legal research to determine if ABC
Bank's policy could be challenged under the CRA. 112 The students
searched relevant corporate and banking records and arcane regulatory interpretations. They found that ABC Bank was a subsidiary of a
bank holding company, that another bank subsidiary of the holding
company made home mortgage loans, and that ABC Bank actually
claimed in certain regulatory submissions that it made home mortgage
loans through the other subsidiary. In its public pronouncements and
111 See text accompanying note 10 supra.
112 [ note the return of students to the picture. After the Clinic's experience with ARA,

we undertook to modify our representation goals in CRA cases, in part to reflect our understanding of the services the Clinic could offer and in part to ensure a larger role for
students in our CRA cases.
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in its meetings with CBO, however, ABC Bank insisted that it did not
make home mortgage loans.
The students counseled CBO about their findings and indicated
that ABC Bank might be violating the CRA. CBO presented these
findings to ABC Bank at a meeting the students attended, but at
which the students did not play a large role. After this meeting, CBO
and ABC Bank had several discussions without including the Clinic; in
fact we did not even know about the discussions until later.
A few months after we began to represent CBO, ABC Bank published a newspaper notice stating that it had filed an application with
its regulator that was covered by the CRA. We notified CBO that it
had an opportunity to file a challenge to the application with ABC
Bank's regulator on the grounds that ABC Bank's policy regarding
home mortgage loans violated the CRA. CBO immediately invited
ABC to resume negotiations, and asked us to assist. The Clinic prepared a comprehensive draft lending proposal for CBO to submit to
ABC Bank, but CBO rejected most of it, preferring to abide by the
more limited terms it had offered to banks at the community forum it
had held. Eventually, negotiations reached a deadline: CBO had to
reach an agreement or file a challenge. ABC Bank had made a "final
offer" that the Clinic felt was inadequate, and we suggested to CBO
that it could get more if it filed a challenge. CBO, however, rejected
this advice. While it recognized that it could get more if it filed a
challenge, it was satisfied with accepting the offer because filing a
challenge would have threatened many of CBO's non-legal concerns.
Ultimately, CBO signed the agreement and the Clinic has helped it
monitor ABC Bank's progress in meeting the agreement's terms.
As with ARA, the Clinic has begun to represent CBO on an
ongoing basis. We continue many of the types of collaborative activities that we were involved in with ARA. 113 For example, Clinic students attend CBO's board meetings, do legal and factual research, and
provide ongoing advice. We also attempt to abandon professional lawyer styles, do non-legal legwork, link CBO with other local and national advocates, and help CBO broaden its CRA efforts to include
other local housing problems. In contrast to our work with ARA,
however, this work is supplementary to CBO's efforts and strategy.
CBO could pursue this work without the Clinic's help; the Clinic seeks
to enable CBO to be more effective by providing the specific legal
assistance it asks us to supply. The Clinic has not become nearly as
deeply involved with CBO's activities, and CBO has continued to emphasize non-legal approaches to fighting redlining.
113
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The Clinic's work with CBO suggests several conditions that
make it possible to work as a facilitative lawyer. First, before CBO
retained us, it had already been working with an organizer. This
organizer was playing the role of a collaborator particularly akin to
White's consciousness-raiser.11 4 Second, with the help of the organizer, CBO had already done a tremendous amount of fact investigation and analysis on its own. It had completed the first three steps of
the CRA enforcement process. Third, CBO had targeted banks and
identified issues that were important to it. Fourth, CBO did not see
legal alternatives as the primary means for accomplishing its goals.
Fifth, CBO is involved in many other activities besides CRA. As a
result, it would be very difficult for the Clinic to become too deeply
involved in its activities.
CONCLUSION

Our work as facilitative lawyers has been promising. We do not
yet know with certainty, however, how well facilitative lawyering for
social change succeeds in both assisting clients against their adversaries and shielding them from their lawyers. What concrete gains do
facilitative lawyers achieve, compared to more collaborative attorneys? How satisfying a role is facilitation, over the long haul, for lawyers who hope to conttibute to social change? How quickly does
facilitation shade into collaboration, or into domination? Can a longterm facilitative relationship with clients eventually turn an outsider
into an insider? As the Clinic's representation of CBO and other clients continues, I am sure I will learn more about the answers to these
questions. I hope this Essay will help other clinicians and lawyers to
formulate their own answers as well.
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